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GUARDIANS OF THE GALAXY: 
HOW SHAREHOLDER LAWYERS WON BIG 
FOR THEIR CLIENTS AND VINDICATED THE 
INTEGRITY OF OUR ECONOMY 
Daniel J. Morrissey 
          Securities class actions are the most economically significant form 
of litigation. Highly skilled lawyers expend huge sums and relentless 
efforts in these matters but because of the costs involved and the potential 
for enormous liability very few of them ever make it to trial. This Article 
is the story of one that did, a mammoth fraud where a jury returned a 
$1.5 billion verdict that, with interest, increased to almost $2.5 billion by 
the time the case reached the appellate court. 
 There the Court upheld the shareholders’ theory that their 
damages could be measured by the excessive amounts they had to pay for 
their shares whose value was artificially inflated by the defendants’ false 
financial statements. In doing that the appellate panel significantly 
strengthened the potential claims of shareholders in these actions by 
accepting a new approach to reckoning their losses called the “leakage 
model.” It allows damages to be determined by fixing the decline in the 
price the stockholders paid for their shares from the time news of the 
fraud first becomes available, rather than when the defendants ultimately 
acknowledge their wrongdoing. 
 
  Daniel J. Morrissey is a professor and former Dean at Gonzaga University Law School. 
With Marc I. Steinberg, Wendy Gerwick Couture, and Michael J. Kaufman, he is co-author of the 
casebook SECURITIES LITIGATION (Carolina Academic Press, 2016). 
The author would like to thank his son, Graham J. Morrissey, for inspiring the title of this 
Article. Along those lines, he would like to declare on behalf of his family and friends, “We are 
Groot.” 
The author would also like to acknowledge academic colleagues Mark Lowenstein, Tamar 
Frankel, Eric Chiappanelli, Jay Silver, and Marc Steinberg for their support and encouragement. 
He would also like to thank friends from the bench and bar as well who were kind enough to read 
and comment on this piece: Hon. Joan Gottschall, Hon. Neil Wake, Don Curran, Darren Robbins, 
Michael Dowd, Spencer Burkholz, and Luke Brooks. The author would also like to thank Head 
Public Service Librarian Ashley Sundin and assistants Vicky Daniels and Kim Sellars for their help 
in preparation of this Article. 
This piece is dedicated to Victoria J. Dodd, Professor Emerita at Suffolk University Law 
School, a renowned legal educator and a dear friend to the author and many others. It is quite fitting 
that this Article, dedicated to Professor Dodd, is appearing in the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
because our friendship began there when we were both young professors. 
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 Thanks to the unyielding work of their lawyers, the case was a 
grand success for the shareholders, returning them a significant 
percentage of the money they lost. Yet it took 14 years to litigate and 
initially cost the plaintiffs’ attorneys, who bore all their clients’ expenses, 
over $30 million. If we are truly committed to achieving justice in these 
shareholder frauds the law must find a more expeditious way to deter 
such wrongful conduct and compensate investors like these who are 
cheated.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION: SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
A large portion of the wealth of our nation lies in the treasuries of 
its publicly held corporations.1 Those resources belong to their 
shareholders2 and are supposed to be managed faithfully for them by 
their officers and directors.3 State corporate laws require that they 
discharge those responsibilities as fiduciaries4 and the federal 
securities laws reinforce that notion by compelling accurate disclosure 
of all significant aspects of their businesses.5 
 
 1. A report in 2011 stated that there were then approximately 6,700 large public corporations 
whose shares were actively traded. It also noted that even though they comprise a small fraction of 
the 5.8 million U.S. businesses operating in the corporate form, those firms generate the lion’s share 
of our country’s economic activity. HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS: A 
LAWYER’S GUIDE 1 (2011). 
  Recent findings, however, indicate that number is shrinking. One stated that although there 
were over 7,000 companies listed on exchanges in the late 1990s, that number is now down to 
3,671. Why the Decline in the Number of Listed American Firms Matters, ECONOMIST: 
SCHUMPETER BLOG (Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/04/22/why-the-
decline-in-the-number-of-listed-american-firms-matters. That author also noted that there are now 
roughly one hundred unicorns, “private firms worth over $1 billion.” Id.; cf. Andy Kessler, 
Unicorns Need IPOs, WALL ST. J. OPINION. (Jan. 7, 2018, 4:37 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/unicorns-need-ipos-1515361043 (asserting that unicorns must make 
public offerings of their shares to achieve the liquidity that will actualize their full potential); see 
also Jason M. Thomas, Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?, WALL ST. J. OPINION (Nov. 
16, 2017, 7:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-have-all-the-public-companies-gone-
1510869125 (stating that the number of initial public offerings has fallen from 845 in 1996 to just 
128 in 2016). Consistent with that, the Wall Street Journal reported that public investors do not 
now own a large number of the “growth stocks.” Id. Instead, shares of those companies have 
“migrated” to private portfolios. Id. As the previously cited author noted critically about that 
phenomenon, “[o]rdinary Americans without connections are meanwhile unable directly to own 
shares in new companies that are active in the fastest-growing parts of the economy. ECONOMIST: 
SCHUMPETER BLOG, supra. 
 2. As one court famously put it: “A business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders.” Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 
1919). As to how that wealth is ultimately distributed to shareholders, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 6.40 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 3. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 4. Id. As one noted commentator stated: “Like both trustees and agents, directors and officers 
act for the benefit of another, in this case the corporation. As such, just as trustees have a fiduciary 
duty to their beneficiaries, and agents have a fiduciary duty to their principals, directors and officers 
have a fiduciary duty to their corporations.” FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278 (2d 
ed. 2010). 
 5. There are two foundational pieces of legislation there. The first, the Securities Act of 1933, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006) (Securities Act), requires, subject to certain exemptions, that 
securities be registered with a government agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 
or Commission), before they can be offered or sold. The second, the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2012) (Exchange Act), contains a host of provisions regulating the 
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While most corporate officials operate their firms honestly and in 
accord with the law,6 some mislead their stockholders and the public 
by distorting the truth about their operations.7 Usually that takes the 
form of falsified disclosures and financial statements designed to 
make their companies appear to be more successful than they really 
are.8 In these situations, those who trade shares are deceived—with 
purchasers paying artificially inflated prices for their stock.9 
When the truth comes out about those misrepresentations by 
public companies, share prices of their stock often drop and investors 
suffer the resulting losses.10 Many times, there are hundreds, 
thousands, or even tens of thousands of shareholders injured by these 
deceptions11 and their damages can run into the millions and in some 
 
trading of securities, including a requirement that public companies make periodic and current 
reports about their operations. 
 6. MARK S. BEASLEY et AL., COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 1998–2007: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 2 
(2010), https://www.coso.org/Documents/COSO-Fraud-Study-2010-001.pdf. 
 7. The same study, however, cataloged 347 false and misleading reporting cases brought by 
the SEC during the years 1997–2008. Id. Since that time, corporate fraud has been on the rise. A 
recent study published by the consulting firm Kroll surveyed a large number of American and 
global firms. Seventy-five percent of them reported that they had been victims of fraud during the 
recent year. KROLL, GLOBAL FRAUD REPORT: VULNERABILITIES ON THE RISE 7 (2015–2016 ed.). 
Forty percent of those companies felt highly or moderately vulnerable to corruption and bribery. 
Id. at 8. 
 8. BEASLEY et AL., supra note 6. 
 9. See infra p. 108. 
 10. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 
502 (1997). 
 11. The ability of these defrauded investors with relatively small claims to band together in a 
class action allows them to seek redress when their individual actions would not merit the expense 
of litigation. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
497, 497 (1997). Another leading commentator made much the same point: “Securities class actions 
have an appealing attraction to those seeking to deter fraud. If a party commits fraud that affects 
hundreds, if not thousands of dispersed shareholders, allowing a plaintiffs’ attorney to aggregate 
the claims into a single class action makes the pursuit of such claims both more manageable and 
economical.” Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 
1522 (2004). The Supreme Court recognized this beneficial aspect of securities class actions with 
these comments in one such case: “Class actions also may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which 
would be uneconomical to litigate individually. For example, this lawsuit involves claims averaging 
about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action 
were not available.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985). A notable critic of 
class actions, however, is the retired U.S. Court of Appeals Judge, Richard Posner. At a gathering 
of lawyers who practice in that area, he referred to class actions as “an invitation to shenanigans” 
because “the client—the class—is basically helpless.” Perry Cooper, Posner: Class Action Rules, 
Constitution Overrated, BLOOMBERG BNA NEWS (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.bna.com/posner-
class-action-n57982081985/. He went on to talk about how lawyers for the class make the 
decisions, but they “seem to be primarily interested in attorneys’ fees . . . . And the defendants are 
just interested in getting off as lightly as they can.” Id.  
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situations even billions of dollars.12 
Such actions are violations of federal13 and state securities laws14 
and may involve other wrongdoings as well, such as mail and wire 
fraud.15 Those responsible may therefore be criminally prosecuted or 
otherwise sanctioned by government agencies, such as the Department 
of Justice and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” 
or the “Commission”), whose mandate is to administer and enforce the 
federal securities laws.16 Unfortunately, they have been less 
aggressive of late in seeking sanctions for such wrongdoing.17 The 
SEC, in particular, lacks the resources to investigate and prosecute 
most of the securities violations that occur.18 
In any event, the SEC does not directly represent individual 
shareholders who have bought stock in companies and been cheated 
 
 12. In recent decades, tens of billions of dollars have been recovered in settlement of these 
shareholders’ suits. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 151, 152 (2009). 
 13. Securities fraud is prohibited by § 17(a) and § 10(b) (along with Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
under it) of the Securities Act, and § 15(c) of the Exchange Act. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b), 15(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 
78o(c) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). Section 24 of the Securities Act and § 32(a) of the 
Exchange Act impose criminal sanctions on anyone who willfully violates the provisions 
proscribing fraud. Securities Act of 1933 § 24; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a).  
 14. The Uniform Securities Act, the basis of securities regulation in many states, criminalizes 
the willful violation of various provisions of that Act, including its registration and anti-fraud 
provisions. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 508 (2002) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS, amended 2005); UNIF. SEC. ACT of 1985 § 604 (1985) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended 1988); UNIF. SEC. ACT of 1956 § 409, 7C U.L.A. 873 (2006). 
 15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2012). 
 16. For a full description of the SEC and its mission, see Office of the Investor Advocate, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/page/investor-advocate-landing-page (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2018). 
 17. See JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO 
PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017); SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE (2016); Patrick Radden Keefe, Limited Liability: 
Why Don’t Corporate Wrongdoers Get Charged?, NEW YORKER, July 31, 2017, at 28. Keefe 
particularly faults the Justice Department for its practice of deferring prosecution of corporate 
wrongdoers. 
 18. When the author was a junior staff attorney in the SEC’s Enforcement Division in the late 
1970s, a senior SEC lawyer told him that the Commission had the resources to prosecute no more 
than 2% of the then occurring securities law violations. Over thirty years later, at a conference on 
securities law held in Portland, Oregon, he heard a similar statement by an SEC official from one 
of its regional offices. This time, the Commission attorney said that his agency only had the ability 
to prosecute 1% of the current securities law violations. MARC I. STEINBERG et AL., SECURITIES 
LITIGATION 685 (2016). A well-respected financial columnist for The New York Times perhaps 
described this situation best with these remarks: “It is no secret that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission is terrifically understaffed and widely underfunded compared with the populous and 
wealthy Wall Street world it is supposed to police.” Gretchen Morgenson, Quick, Call Tech Support 
for the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at 31. 
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by paying more than they should have.19 However, given the human 
temptation to such misconduct that is ever-present to those who 
control “other people’s money,”20 it is hard to see how the trust needed 
in private capital formation could exist if investors did not have the 
means to recover their losses caused by such wrongful activity. 
Fortunately, our legal system affords defrauded investors an 
avenue to seek such redress by bringing their own civil claims in these 
matters.21 The prospect of liability thus compels those seeking capital 
to make accurate disclosure of all relevant information that investors 
might need.22 It also provides that they may be held financially 
responsible when they fail to do so.23 
 Securities frauds that involve large numbers of shareholders are 
mass torts.24 To remedy them, the legal system allows stockholder 
victims to bring suit together as a class against the corporations and 
their officials who perpetrate such wrongs.25 Those actions not only 
allow defrauded shareholders to recoup their damages, but they also 
deter others who might consider engaging in such illegal activity.26  
A Congressional Committee aptly described the dual function 
that these suits have to both compensate victims and discourage such 
transgressions in the future. 
Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool with 
which defrauded investors can recover their losses without 
having to rely on government action. Such private lawsuits 
promote public and global confidence in our capital markets 
and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate 
 
 19. The SEC, however, does advise aggrieved investors on its website about various legal 
remedies they might pursue to seek redress for securities fraud. See How Can Investors Get Money 
Back in a Fraud Case Involving a Violation of the Federal Securities Laws?, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/page/investor-section-landing (last modified Dec. 29, 2016). 
 20. The classic work here is LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE 
BANKERS USE IT (1914). 
 21. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2012). 
 22. STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 7. 
 23. See id. (“Securities litigation also compensates investors who are injured by incomplete or 
inaccurate disclosures, and the availability of that encourages investors to enter the market.”). 
 24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3). 
 25. See STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 9–10. 
 26. See Marc I. Steinberg, Curtailing Investor Protection Under the Securities Laws: Good 
for the Economy?, 55 SMU L. REV. 347, 353–54 (2002). Given that settlements in the typical 
shareholder class action suit may not provide much compensation to individual shareholders, 
deterrence may be their principle benefit. Ann M. Lipton, Reviving Reliance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
91, 102 (2017). In the case discussed in this Article, however, the shareholders did recover a 
significant percentage of their losses. See infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
(9)51.1_MORRISEY (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2019  3:44 PM 
206 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:199 
officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly 
perform their jobs.27 
The Supreme Court has also noted the need for shareholder suits 
to police corrupt corporate activity. As it said in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd., “This Court has long recognized that 
meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws 
are an essential supplement to criminal and civil enforcement actions 
brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC).”28 In addition, as noted by one 
commentator, shareholder plaintiffs and their attorneys “may be more 
willing to invest in complex cases and expand the boundaries of the 
law than their public counterparts.”29 
These suits, known as securities class actions, are complex legal 
proceedings. The lawyers who bring them must not only be 
knowledgeable in the intricate laws and policies governing financial 
instruments, but they also have to be highly skilled in pretrial and trial 
practice.30 In addition, these cases entail great risks for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys who take them on.31 This litigation is hugely expensive for 
those law firms and they typically undertake them on a contingent fee 
basis, receiving no compensation unless their clients secure a 
 
 27. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 28. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). The Supreme 
Court made similar statements several times in earlier cases. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill 
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 
(1964). In another case, the Court also had this to say about the general importance of private anti-
fraud actions: “[A] dynamic, free economy presupposes a high degree of integrity in all of its parts, 
an integrity that must be underwritten by rules enforceable in fair, independent, accessible courts.” 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008). 
 29. Lipton, supra note 26, at 100. 
 30. For an elaborate discussion of all the litigation skills that these suits require, see 
STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 573, 623. Shareholder class actions suits, however, are not 
without their critics. In a case involving claims that a company did not make appropriate disclosures 
to stockholders regarding a merger, Judge Richard Posner used a well-worn pejorative term, “strike 
suit”, to describe such actions brought “for the sole purpose of obtaining fees for the plaintiffs’ 
counsel.” Hays v. Walgreen Co. (In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig.), 832 F.3d 718, 721 (7th 
Cir. 2016); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Posner Opinion Blasts Class Actions that Are ‘No Better 
than a Racket’, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 12, 2016, 8:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article 
/posner_opinion_blasts_class_actions_that_are_no_better_than_a_racket; Cooper, supra note 11 
(Judge Posner (now retired) has made what one observer called “tongue-in-cheek” comments about 
class actions by calling them “an invitation to shenanigans.”). 
 31. Professor Cox described the intrepid attitude of the lawyers who bring these often 
mammoth suits: “[T] he sheer size of the aggregated claim attracts not only the entrepreneurial 
skills of the class lawyer but also commands the full attention of the defendants.” Cox, supra note 
10, at 497. 
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recovery.32 
II.  THE HOUSEHOLD SUIT 
This Article describes such a case brought against a major 
financial institution, Household International, Inc. (Household). It is 
one of the most significant securities class actions of recent times 
because it not only achieved a standout result for shareholders, but it 
was also one of very few such suits that actually went to trial.33 While 
it may be a bit much to call lawyers who bring these actions 
“Guardians of the Galaxy,”34 this litigation demonstrates how difficult 
it is for shareholders to prevail in these matters, yet how essential the 
work of their lawyers is to maintaining the honesty of our economy 
and the integrity of our financial markets. 
In Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc.,35 over thirty 
thousand shareholders36 sued together claiming that they suffered 
losses because of the public representations made by the company and 
some of its senior officials.37 It took fourteen years to litigate the 
matter.38 That entailed seven years of pretrial practice,39 a twenty-six 
 
 32. As one commentator put it succinctly, lead counsel in these cases is the “litigation’s 
financier.” Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 1115 
(2011). As the author stated earlier in that article, “Good lead counsel is hard to find,” going on to 
discuss various approaches to make sure that such lawyers adequately represent the interests of 
their clients, the defrauded shareholders. Id. at 1110. Others have also expressed concerns that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, facing mounting financial challenges, would agree to an inadequate settlement 
out of self-interest. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the 
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 281 (1983). Professor 
Burch’s article discusses these issues in the context of the requirement that the Court appoint a lead 
plaintiff counsel in securities class actions. Burch, supra. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
§ 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(b)(v) (2012). 
 33. See Matthew L. Mustokoff & Margaret E. Mazzeo, Loss Causation on Trial in Rule 10b-
5 Litigation a Decade After Dura, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 175, 217 (2017) (“Moreover, there is no 
reason to believe that the rate of securities class actions advancing to trial—21 out of roughly 5,000 
cases filed . . . , or 0.4%—will increase any time soon.”). 
 34. See Guardians of the Galaxy (film), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardians_ 
of_the_Galaxy (last edited Jan. 12, 2019, Oct. 15, 2018, 7:00 PM) (“Guardians of the Galaxy . . . 
is a 2014 American superhero film based on the Marvel Comics superhero team . . . .”). 
 35. 787 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 36. This and much of the procedural history of the case are taken from an elaborate report to 
the court by plaintiffs’ counsel. See Declaration of Spencer A. Burkholz in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees 
and Expenses and Award of Expenses to Lead Plaintiffs at 3, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. 
Household Int’l, Inc., 2016 WL 10571774 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2016) (No. 02-C-5893) [hereinafter 
Burkholz Report]. 
 37. Id. at 5. 
 38. Id. at 4. 
 39. Id. at 5–90. 
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day jury trial40 that resulted in a whopping $1.5 billion verdict (which 
the award of prejudgment interest increased to nearly $2.5 billion),41 
and an elaborate post-trial claims process.42 After that came a reversal 
on appeal43 and lengthy preparations for a retrial that culminated in a 
final settlement of $1.575 billion in the early morning hours before the 
second trial was to begin.44 
All in all the plaintiffs and their lawyers achieved a stunning 
outcome, returning investors a large percentage of their losses.45 The 
trial judge stated at a pretrial hearing that there were a hundred ways 
that the plaintiffs could lose the case, but only one way that they could 
win it.46 But win it they did, with the lawyers for the class vindicating 
the integrity of our financial system. 
The Court of Appeals began its opinion, which ultimately sent the 
case back for retrial, by noting the complexity and lengthy procedural 
history of the Household case.47 Instead of recounting all of that 
however, the panel said it would “start with the view from 10,000 feet 
and add details relevant to particular issues as needed.”48 The case did 
indeed raise a host of legal questions and as the Court of Appeals said, 
“a tome” could be written about all of them.49 
This Article however will adopt a middle ground, describing this 
record-setting lawsuit50 more extensively than did the Court of 
Appeals. It will present that in the context of the rules and policies that 
make up this highly specialized but extremely important area of law. 
Ultimately, all that will form a backdrop to a discussion of the issue 
 
 40. Id. at 1. 
 41. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 42. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 2. 
 43. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 433. 
 44. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 1. 
 45. Depending on the damage model used, class members recovered amounts that were 
between 75% to 252% of their losses. That far exceeds the percentage recovery of all the other 
securities settlements valued in excess of $500 million. Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Plan of Allocation of Settlement 
Proceeds at 1, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 2016 WL 10571774 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 10, 2016) (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 02-C-5893) [hereinafter Reply Memo]. 
 46. As recounted to the author by Michael Dowd, attorney for the plaintiff. 
 47. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413–14. 
 48. Id. at 413. 
 49. Id. 
 50. As the court of appeals noted, the “enormous” $2.46 billion judgment for the plaintiffs 
appeared to be one of the largest to date. Id. at 412 (citing Reuters, HSBC Faces $2.46 Billion 
Judgment in Securities Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/10/18/business/hsbc-is-fined-2-46-billion-in-securities-fraud-case.html). 
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that the Court of Appeals found so crucial—how to calculate 
shareholder damages in such a huge fraud. 
A.  The Fraud 
Household was a Chicago-based holding company with 
subsidiaries that provided loans to subprime customers—individuals 
who for the most part had less than stellar credit histories.51 By the 
1990s, through growth and acquisitions, Household had become one 
of the nation’s largest mortgage lenders.52 It also made home-equity 
loans and engaged in auto financing and credit card lending.53 
Household funded much of its operations by reselling its loans as 
asset-backed securities and continuing to service them for a fee.54 For 
the five years from October 1997 to October 2002, it used that process 
to raise $75 billion.55 
The company supported those sales of its loans as well as the price 
of its stock by assuring the market that its loan pools were stable and 
consistently profitable.56 It claimed to have achieved that by using 
sophisticated centralized technology that gave it a competitive 
advantage in monitoring its customers’ accounts to guard against 
delinquencies.57 
In reality, however, Household’s purported success resulted from 
predatory lending practices that confused its borrowers about interest 
rates and other aspects of their obligations.58 It was also attributable to 
what might euphemistically be called “re-aging” and “restructuring” 
of its non-performing loans.59 That involved distortion of metrics used 
to record the percentage of its loans that were delinquent so that they 
 
 51. Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities 
Laws at 4, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 928 (N.D. Ill. 
2010) (No. 02-C-5893) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 52. Id. at 4. 
 53. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413. 
 54. Complaint, supra note 51, at 5. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 4. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413. Throughout its early history, however, 
Household did not encourage such improvident practices by its customers. As one of its early radio 
commercials put it: “Never borrow money needlessly, just when you must. Borrow where the loans 
are a specialty from folks you trust. Borrow confidently from H-F-C.” HFC - Household Finance 
Corporation: Radio Commercials, YOUTUBE (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=vg5gtjKhRDc. 
 59. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413. 
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would not have to be written down as uncollectable.60 In addition, 
Household used other impermissible accounting techniques to make 
its operations appear stronger and more lucrative than they were.61 
These practices, which began in 1997, were authorized by the 
company’s top officials and were ingrained in Household’s corporate 
culture.62 Most significantly, they made it possible for Household 
falsely to report record financial results that bolstered the price of its 
shares. Between the summers of 1999 and 2001, the company’s stock 
price thus rose more than 50% from around $40 per share to the mid 
$60s, hitting a high of $69 in July 2001.63 
The truth about the company however began to emerge later that 
year due to investigations and legal actions by various State Attorneys 
General that focused on Household’s illegal lending practices.64 Those 
began with a suit by California on November 15, 2001.65 Household 
ultimately settled them on October 11, 2002 by paying $484 million 
to all fifty states.66 That resulted in the company taking a $525 million 
charge to its financial statements.67 Household was also forced to 
restate its financials due to improper accounting of its expenses.68 That 
lowered its earnings by $386 million.69 
Between the initiation of the California action and the multistate 
settlement, the price of the company’s shares decreased 54% from 
$60.90 to $28.20—far worse than drops in the comparative S&P 500 
and S&P financial indexes that were respectively 25% and 21%.70 
Perhaps believing it would then be getting a bargain, HSBC Holdings 
from the United Kingdom, at that time the world’s second largest 
bank, acquired Household in November 2002 for just over $16 
billion.71 It was a decision that HSBC would later regret because it 
eventually made that financial giant liable in this litigation as 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Complaint, supra note 51, at 19–23. 
 63. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 5. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 413. 
 71. Erik Portanger et al., HSBC Sets $16 Billion Deal for Household International, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 15, 2002, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1037262079434607068. 
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Household’s successor.72 
 Household’s problems with government authorities however 
were not over. Its final day of reckoning with them came in March 
2003 when it entered into a consent decree with the SEC agreeing to 
cease and desist from engaging in improper re-aging of its delinquent 
accounts.73 
B.  Pre-Trial Litigation 
The first shareholder fraud complaints were filed in August 2002 
in the U.S. District Court in Chicago.74 On October 18, 2002, when 
the number of similar suits filed had risen to seven, a group of 
investors led by Glickenhaus Institutional Group and represented by 
the law firm later renamed Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd (Robbins 
Geller)75 moved to have the actions consolidated and be designated 
lead plaintiff and counsel. After several other plaintiffs and their 
attorneys withdrew similar motions, the court granted Glickenhaus 
and Robbins Geller’s motion on December 18, 2002.76 
Several months later, the Robbins Geller firm filed a 154 page 
consolidated complaint.77 In addition to Household, it named as 
defendants 16 officers and directors of the company as well as its 
auditor, Arthur Anderson, and two investment banks that had 
 
 72. Household was merged into Household International, Inc. and its name changed to HSBC 
Finance Corporation. As the company’s press release stated, “The name change to HSBC Finance 
Corporation furthers the rebranding of Household to HSBC.” The release also announced that 
HSBC would assume all the obligations of Household. HSBC Merges Household Finance 
Corporation into Household International, Inc.; Renames Entity “HSBC Finance Corporation”, 
BUS. WIRE (Dec. 15, 2004, 4:01 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/200412150057 
87/en/HSBC-Merges-Household-Finance-Corporation-Household-International. 
  By March 2009, HSBC was shutting down much of the consumer finance business it had 
gotten by purchasing Household and writing off its value. HSBC’s Chairman Stephen Green then 
said, “With the benefit of hindsight, this is an acquisition we wish we had not undertaken.” Steve 
Slater, HSBC Retreats from U.S., Regrets Household Deal, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2009, 4:22 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-us-sb-idUSTRE52127520090302. 
 73. Household International Agrees to Cease-and-Desist Order for False and Misleading 
Statements About Restructuring Policies Concerning Delinquent Loans, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-35.htm (last modified Mar. 19, 2003). 
 74. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 5. 
 75. The Robbins Geller firm is among the most prominent group of lawyers who represent 
shareholders. It has obtained some of the largest securities class action recoveries in American legal 
history, including most famously a $7 billion settlement in litigation on behalf of the shareholders 
of Enron. In recent years, it has continued to rank first in the total amount recovered for investors. 
See The Right Choice, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, https://www.rgrdlaw.com 
/firm.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
 76. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 6–7. 
 77. Complaint, supra note 51. 
(9)51.1_MORRISEY (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2019  3:44 PM 
212 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:199 
underwritten a public offering by Household.78 The complaint went on 
to state various fraud claims on behalf of all those who had purchased 
or otherwise acquired Household securities between October 23, 1997 
and October 11, 2002.79 
It also alleged in great detail how during that period the 
defendants made a number of false representations and material 
omissions about various aspects of Household’s operations.80 Those 
included its lending practices, delinquency rates, and earnings from 
credit-card agreements.81 Those also involved the company’s failure 
to disclose its predatory lending, the concealment of its loan 
delinquencies by “re-aging” or restructuring them, and a number of 
other practices that Household engaged in to make it appear more 
profitable than it really was.82 
The complaint also alleged that Arthur Anderson had participated 
in Household’s fraudulent scheme.83 It charged that the investment 
banks were therefore liable in their roles as underwriters and experts 
in an SEC-registered offering of securities issued by Household in 
1998.84 The company used those to acquire another subprime lender, 
Beneficial Finance Company.85 
 Amendments added to the federal securities laws by the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) include a 
provision staying discovery until claims in securities fraud class 
actions survive a motion to dismiss.86 That fact-finding process was 
thus not available to the plaintiffs until they could overcome extensive 
challenges by the defendants to the legal sufficiency of their causes of 
action. 
Those entailed arguments that the complaint failed to meet other 
requirements of the PSLRA—specifically that the plaintiffs plead the 
fraud with particularity87 and that the facts in the complaint give rise 
 
 78. Id. at 14–18. 
 79. Id. at 1. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 82. Id. at 423. 
 83. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 10. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 87. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
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to a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter.88 
Household’s motion to dismiss along those lines included a 
potpourri of other contentions as well. Among them were charges that 
the complaint fell short of establishing certain elements of the causes 
of action that it alleged.89 
Plaintiffs answered with a fifty-five page memorandum in 
opposition to Household’s motion to dismiss and with extensive briefs 
responding to contentions made by the other defendants.90 In all, they 
cited over one hundred cases in an attempt to refute each of the 
arguments made by the defendants that the litigation should not go 
forward. Approximately nine months later in May 2004 the Court 
ruled, upholding some of the plaintiffs’ claims and dismissing 
others.91 
The upshot was that Household and its officials remained in the 
case.92 Arthur Anderson did as well, but since it was in the process of 
dissolution because of its involvement in the Enron scandal, it settled 
with the plaintiffs for $1.5 million.93 The investment bankers however 
were released because the statute of limitations had run on the claims 
covering their role in the fraud.94 
 The defendants nevertheless made two subsequent motions to 
dismiss in 2005 based on cases recently decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.95 The 
ruling from the High Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo,96 
which dealt with loss causation, would remain significant throughout 
the case and its eventual appeal.97 The trial court however denied both 
motions at that time.98 It also turned aside an attempt by the defendants 
to have its ruling on the Dura issue certified as an interlocutory 
 
 88. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2); see Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (holding that the inference of scienter “must be more than merely 
‘reasonable’ or ‘permissible’—it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in the light of other 
explanations”). 
 89. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 11–12. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 14. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 14, 73. 
 94. Id. at 14. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 97. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 16. 
 98. Even though the Court denied those motions, its ruling did result in the shortening of the 
class period in the Household action. Id. at 16–17. 
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appeal.99 
With the Court’s denial of the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the 
stay on discovery was lifted.100 The parties then vigorously engaged 
in that for over three years.101 As a result, the plaintiffs obtained over 
four million pages of documents from defendants and third parties, 
including extensive government reports about the defendants’ 
predatory lending practices.102 Those of course required a massive 
amount of attorney time to examine and analyze.103 
In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel took the depositions of more than 
fifty former and current Household employees and issued subpoenas 
for documents and depositions to dozens of third parties, almost all of 
whom objected to those requests.104 The defendants in turn served 
wide-ranging interrogatories, made elaborate requests for documents, 
and issued numerous subpoenas for depositions of their own.105 
Due to the complexities of those demands and the disputes that 
arose from them, the parties made over forty motions related to 
discovery.106 Many involved issues like privilege and work product 
and most of them required full briefing before a U.S. Magistrate 
assigned to the case could decide them.107 In addition, both parties 
retained experts.108 Not surprisingly, discovery controversies about 
them had to be resolved as well.109 
To manage all of this the parties attended over a dozen status 
conferences with either the magistrate or the trial judge and submitted 
numerous reports to them in anticipation of those meetings.110 At the 
close of discovery, the defendants made extensive motions for 
summary judgment, which the plaintiffs answered and the Court held 
in abeyance until the trial.111 
Although the parties had engaged in settlement discussions 
throughout this process, the defendants made no offers acceptable to 
 
 99. Id. at 18. 
 100. Id. at 20. 
 101. Id. at 20–26. 
 102. Id. at 72. 
 103. Id. at 27. 
 104. Id. at 21–26. 
 105. Id. at 26–27. 
 106. Id. at 28. 
 107. Id. at 27–64. 
 108. Id. at 65–68, 70. 
 109. Id. at 69–71. 
 110. Id. at 71–72. 
 111. Id. at 73–75. 
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plaintiffs.112 The case was then set for trial on March 30, 2009.113 By 
that time, the parties had stipulated to class certification114 and the 
defendants were winnowed down to four: Household itself and three 
of its former top officers, William Aldinger, the CEO, David 
Schoenholz, the CFO, and Gary Gilmer, Household’s Vice-Chairman 
and President of Consumer Lending.115 By agreement, the parties had 
likewise narrowed the grounds upon which the law would hold those 
defendants legally culpable.116 
C.  The Rule 10b-5 Cause of Action 
As a result, by the time of trial the potential liability of the 
defendants rested in large part117 on one significant provision of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 10(b),118 and Exchange Act 
Rule 10b-5119 that the Commission had made under it. Section 10(b) 
is an enabling statute that grants the SEC power to make rules 
prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security.120 Under that authority, the Commission promulgated Rule 
10b-5—a broad, “catch-all”121 regulation. Subpart two of that 
provision declares it a crime to make a materially false or misleading 
statement in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.122 
In the post-World War II era, federal courts expanded the scope 
of that rule from just a criminal provision to one that implies a civil 
cause of action as well.123 Victims of securities fraud thus began using 
Rule 10b-5 to bring private actions in federal court. By the mid-1970s, 
 
 112. Id. at 14546. 
 113. Id. at 75. 
 114. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 115. Id. at 426. 
 116. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 105. 
 117. Id. at 14. Plaintiffs also alleged that the individual defendants were liable under § 20(a) of 
the Exchange Act,  which provides liability for persons who control those who are liable under the 
Act. Id. at 8. 
 118. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5 (2018). 
 119. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2018). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976). 
 122. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2018). 
 123. The leading case there is Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802–03 (E.D. Pa. 
1947), modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Because Rule 10b-5 civil 
actions are not predicated on an express provision like other causes of action in the federal securities 
laws, “. . . there is ample room for litigants to assert creative and unique arguments, which makes 
the study and practice of securities fraud litigation both dynamic and interesting.” STEINBERG et 
AL., supra note 18, at 168. 
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such suits had become a major vehicle for business litigation. 
In critical remarks responding to that, Justice Rehnquist then 
called them “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a 
legislative acorn”124 and also stated: “There has been widespread 
recognition that litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of 
vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which 
accompanies litigation in general . . . .”125 
Because of Justice Rehnquist’s comments in the Blue Chip 
Stamps case126 and two other Supreme Court opinions that followed 
it, which also restricted 10b-5 claims,127 it seemed the then 
conservative Supreme Court might even rescind such a judicially 
created extension of federal power. In a 1983 decision however the 
High Court ended that speculation stating that the existence of the 10b-
5 civil remedy, which courts had consistently recognized for thirty-
five years, was “beyond peradventure.”128 
The 10b-5 cause of action thus survived and in its contemporary 
jurisprudence the Supreme Court has listed six elements that a plaintiff 
must prove to recover under it.129 First, there must be a material 
misrepresentation (or omission).130 Second, the plaintiff must prove 
the defendants’ scienter, i.e. a wrongful state of mind.131 Third, the 
material misstatement or omission must be in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security.132 Fourth, there must be a showing of 
reliance, often referred to in cases involving public securities markets 
(fraud-on-the-market cases) as “transaction causation.”133 Fifth, there 
must be proof that the investor has suffered economic loss and, sixth, 
 
 124. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 125. Id. at 739. 
 126. Id. at 73132 (explaining how lower federal district courts have held that only purchasers 
and sellers of securities could bring claims under 10b-5). 
 127. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 20507 (1976) (holding that to be liable under 
10b-5, a defendant had to have acted with scienter); STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 228–36; 
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 (1977) (holding that 10b-5 could only apply in 
situations where the defendants had been guilty of making material misrepresentations or not 
disclosing material facts); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that 
Justice Harry Blackmun was a persistent dissenter throughout these opinions, at one point accusing 
the majority of having a “preternatural solicitousness” for the corporate establishment). 
 128. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). 
 129. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014); 
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 34142 (2005). 
 130. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2407. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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the plaintiff must show a causal connection between the material 
misrepresentation and the decline in the value of the security.134 
D.  Loss Causation 
It was that last element, loss causation, which proved the major 
hurdle to recovery in Household, and under Rule 10b-5 the plaintiffs 
had the burden to prove it.135 The federal securities laws however 
contain two express civil causes of action for securities fraud and 
either one would have made it easier for the plaintiffs in Household to 
prevail on that issue because they both reverse the burden of proof 
there.136 
 Section 11 of the Securities Act137 gives an express cause of 
action to those who purchase securities traceable to an offering made 
in an effective SEC registration statement that contains a material 
misstatement. It allows them to bring the action not only versus the 
issuer but also directly against a number of individuals who 
participated in the offering.138 That avenue for recovery however was 
inapplicable here because the Household plaintiffs who remained after 
the dismissal of the investment bankers purchased their shares in the 
secondary market.139 
Another cause of action, § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act,140 
appears to go beyond § 11 however and affords a broader remedy for 
all those who suffer losses because of materially false or misleading 
statements made in a “prospectus.”141 In a 1995 opinion,142 however, 
the Supreme Court limited the meaning of that to solely a selling 
document used in a public offering, which was not the case in the 
Household action. 
In addition § 12(a)(2) contains a privity requirement giving a 
remedy only against sellers of securities.143 The High Court again gave 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 136. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012); id. § 12(a)(2). 
 137. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 14. 
 140. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995). For the author’s criticism of that case, 
see Daniel J. Morrissey, Shareholder Litigation After the Meltdown, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 531, 565–
67 (2012). 
 143. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). 
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a narrow meaning to that word, defining a “seller” as just one who 
passes title to a security or receives a financial benefit for 
recommending its purchase.144 The plaintiffs in Household could thus 
not use § 12(a)(2) on those grounds either because they bought their 
shares in the open market, not directly from the company. 
That was unfortunate because both § 11 and § 12(a)(2) offer 
defrauded shareholders much better vehicles for recovery on the issue 
of causation.145 To avoid liability under both, the defendants must 
show that the plaintiffs’ losses resulted from factors other than its false 
statements.146 By contrast, the burden is on 10b-5 plaintiffs to prove 
causation in two ways. 
First, they must show that they relied on the defendants’ 
misrepresentation or omission in purchasing the securities.147 That 
satisfies one aspect of those requirements usually called “transaction 
causation.”148 In other words, “but for” the misrepresentations or 
omissions, the plaintiffs would not have bought the stock or paid such 
a high price for it.149 
In the context of a class action such as the Household case, there 
may be tens of thousands of shareholders. It would obviously be 
prohibitively expensive for the plaintiffs’ lawyers to adduce testimony 
from each purchasing stockholder that the defendants’ falsehoods 
misled her into paying a higher price for her shares than was justified. 
To overcome that difficulty courts have adopted a presumption 
 
 144. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 649 (1988). 
 145. In addition to the causation issue, defendants seeking to avoid liability under both § 11 
and § 12(a)(2) have the burden of proving that they were not negligent in providing untruthful 
information to the purchasers of their shares. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77k(b)(3) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 77l (a)(2). 
  By contrast, Rule 10b-5 puts the burden to prove that crucial state-of-mind element on the 
plaintiffs. See STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 228. Even though Rule 10b-5 contains no 
provision requiring a showing of the defendants’ intentions for liability, the Court in Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) found that the language used in its enabling statute, § 10(b), 
requires more than mere negligence for civil liability. See STEINBERG et AL., supra note 18, at 236. 
In addition, under the PSLRA, defrauded shareholders must first plead facts, without the benefit of 
discovery, that create a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter; then, at trial, the 
shareholders must prove scienter by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 171, 227. 
 146. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2012); id. § 12(b); Akerman v. Oryx 
Commc’ns, Inc., 810 F.2d 336, 341 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 147. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008). 
 148. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804, 812 (2011); 
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 149. In cases involving material omissions, courts will presume that a reasonable investor might 
have considered those facts significant, thus satisfying the reliance element. Affiliated Ute Citizens 
of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972). 
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called fraud-on-the-market that may establish that each class member 
relied on the stock’s price as an accurate indicator of its value.150 That 
theory is a corollary to an economic principal called the efficient 
market hypothesis. It holds that the price of a share in a closely 
followed and heavily traded stock reflects the market’s best estimate 
of its worth at any point in time.151 
False information however skews that assessment, distorting the 
stock’s true value and usually causing share purchasers to pay more 
than they should. The Supreme Court accepted that assumption in 
1988 in a case, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.152 More than a quarter century 
later, in 2014, the High Court revisited it in the Halliburton II case 
which contested its continuing viability.153 The Court there turned 
away that challenge and reaffirmed the usefulness of the fraud-on-the-
market theory.154 It did rule, however, that defendants could introduce 
evidence at the class certification stage that the presumption was 
unwarranted in a particular case.155 
Because of a Supreme Court case decided in 2005, however, a 
second aspect of the plaintiff’s proof of causation—that the plaintiff’s 
losses actually resulted from the falsehoods—became more difficult. 
The PSLRA already required that plaintiffs prove “loss causation”156 
as well as the “transaction causation” just discussed.157 The decision, 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,158 however, reversed the 
holding from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit that allowed 
the plaintiff to satisfy that requirement by simply alleging that a 
misrepresentation inflated the price of a security at the time it was 
 
 150. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988). 
 151. Eugene Fama, an economics professor at the University of Chicago, is known as the 
“father of the efficient market theory.” Eugene Fama, King of Predictable Markets, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 26, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/business /eugene-fama-king-of-predictable-
markets.html. In 2013, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. Id. 
  With these remarks, one commentator summed up how this presumption eliminates the 
need to show that each investor has relied on the fraudulent statements. “The doctrine [of fraud-on-
the-market] affords plaintiffs in a section 10(b) action the benefit of two presumptions: first, that 
any material information—including false information—introduced into an ‘open and developed 
market’ influences stock prices, and second, that investors who transact in such a market ‘rely’ on 
stock prices when they purchase at the market price.” Lipton, supra note 26, at 101. 
 152. 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
 153. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 154. Id. at 2410. 
 155. Id. at 2414–15. 
 156. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012). 
 157. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972). 
 158. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
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made.159 
The defendant company in Dura was charged with making false 
statements about its medical product.160 When the truth came out, its 
stock price dropped precipitously but it recovered all that value a week 
later. While conceding that an inflated purchase price may “touch 
upon”161 a later economic loss, the Court held that alone was not 
sufficient to show that the falsehood was the proximate cause of the 
shareholder’s economic loss.162 
More facts therefore would have to be plead and proven to 
establish that element. Accordingly, the plaintiffs in Household 
engaged a witness who was an expert in law and economic theory to 
show that the decline in the worth of their shares resulted from the 
defendants’ falsehoods.163 While the Court of Appeals found his 
testimony generally probative, it reversed the initial verdict in the 
plaintiffs’ favor because it said the expert’s opinion lacked specificity 
in certain areas.164 
 Another aspect of 10b-5 jurisprudence served as a barrier to the 
plaintiffs’ success as well. It arose from a 2011 Supreme Court 
decision, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,165 
where the High Court gave a narrow, literal ruling in interpreting 
liability under Rule 10b-5(2). It requires that to be liable, a defendant 
must “make” a false statement.166 In Janus, the investment adviser of 
a mutual fund controlled the company and drafted the allegedly false 
and misleading prospectus that the fund used to sell its shares.167 
The Court nevertheless found that the adviser was not the author 
of the prospectus because it was a statement of the fund.168 The adviser 
therefore could not have “made” any falsehoods that it contained. In 
the same manner, Household officials who merely furnished false 
information for a statement ultimately attributed to either the 
corporation or another officer could therefore not be liable for 
 
 159. Id. at 338. 
 160. Id. at 339. 
 161. Id. at 343. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 65. 
 164. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 423 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 165. 564 U.S. 135, 144 (2011). 
 166. Id. at 149. 
 167. Id. at 135. 
 168. Id. at 146–47. 
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wrongdoing under 10b-5.169 
E.  Trial Preparation 
At a status hearing on June 30, 2008, the case was set for trial nine 
months later, on March 30, 2009.170 Given the tens of thousands of 
documents that had surfaced during discovery and the more than fifty 
potential witnesses deposed, preparation for trial was arduous and 
required extensive effort. The strategy included culling documents and 
witnesses for presentation at trial, issuing subpoenas, and preparing 
various motions in limine.171 In addition, the lawyers had to prepare 
for voir dire and draft verdict forms and jury instructions.172 
By the end of February 2009, a twenty-person team of lawyers, 
forensic accountants, and support personnel relocated to Chicago to 
prepare for trial.173 Defense firms made preparations that involved 
even larger numbers of attorneys and their assistants.174 Lawyers for 
the parties then entered into wide-ranging negotiations to draft a pre-
trial order.175 Earlier they had been able to stipulate to class 
certification and they ultimately agreed on a host of other evidentiary 
and procedural matters as well. Those included a description of the 
case that they would present to the jury.176 
There was however lengthy pretrial sparring between the parties 
which included unsuccessful motions for evidentiary sanctions that the 
plaintiffs brought against the defendants for allegedly failing to 
preserve relevant documents. The parties also battled over the 
qualifications of expert witnesses, the relevance of certain material 
that might prove prejudicial to either party, and various matters which 
the defendants claimed were privileged.177 All this culminated in a 
pretrial conference that lasted over the course of eight days where the 
parties settled some of those disputes, the Court decided others, and 
still more were designated for rulings at trial.178 
 
 169. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 426. 
 170. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 76. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 128. 
 176. Id. at 7677. 
 177. Id. at 80. 
 178. Id. at 7690. 
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F.  The Trial 
The trial began at the end of March 2009 and lasted over five 
weeks.179 Twenty-two witnesses testified, including each of the three 
individual Defendants still in the case.180 On cross-examination 
William Aldinger—Household’s former CEO—made the bombshell 
admission that disclosures in the Company’s 2001 annual report were 
materially false and misleading.181 
Plaintiffs also presented forceful evidence of Household’s 
predatory lending, which included showing the jury training videos 
made for the Company’s employees that instructed them how to 
engage in those unscrupulous practices.182 They also laid out how the 
Defendants manipulated the quality of their loan portfolios by 
disguising customer delinquencies.183 In addition, even though the 
Court had earlier excluded introduction of Household’s settlements 
with state authorities, the Plaintiffs were nonetheless able to get those 
into evidence after the Defendants opened the door to their 
admission.184 
After closing argument, the Court instructed the jurors that they 
were to determine which, if any, of the forty statements in issue made 
by the Defendants were materially false.185 If any were, they were then 
asked to identify which of the four Defendants were responsible for 
them and to find if those entities or persons made them knowingly or 
recklessly.186 
The jurors returned a verdict that seventeen of the statements 
were indeed materially false, all of which were made between March 
23, 2001 and October 11, 2002.187 As perhaps a compromise, 
however, they found that the other twenty-three statements made 
earlier in the class period were not.188 Since it established liability, the 
jury then had to address the question of causation and determine how 
Household’s stock was overpriced due to those falsehoods.189 The 
 
 179. Id. at 90. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 91. 
 182. Id. at 136. 
 183. Id. at 87. 
 184. Id. at 91. 
 185. Id. at 147. 
 186. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 41314 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 414. 
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plaintiffs’ expert had presented two alternatives for that at trial.190 
The first was called the “specific-disclosure” model and reckoned 
damages based on fourteen separate disclosure events.191 The net total 
effect of those on Household’s shares, as established by the plaintiffs’ 
expert, was a decline of $7.97—indicating that the misrepresentations 
inflated the company’s stock by that amount.192 The jurors were thus 
given a table to complete if they accepted that model which would list 
the amount Household’s stock was overpriced on a given day during 
the period of the falsehoods—with the maximum amount being 
$7.97.193 
The jury however had an alternative way to calculate damages 
that the plaintiffs’ expert also presented to it called the “leakage” 
model.194 It was premised on the belief that the truth about a 
company’s inflated stock price may become known not just from 
significantly specific corrective disclosures but also from other 
information that may leak out to some market participants before its 
general release.195 
In the Household case, that may have begun as early as the 
announcements of actions by the State Attorneys General and 
continued with other news about the company’s true situation from 
various sources.196 The cumulative effect of all those disclosures—the 
net sum of the resulting price declines—would compound the drop in 
Household’s stock price beyond what the specific disclosure model 
allowed.197 
The jury adopted the leakage model and based on the calculations 
presented there by the Plaintiffs’ expert it determined that the 
falsehoods overpriced Household’s stock by $23.94.198 It entered that 
on its table, added the amounts for each day during the relevant period, 
and came back with what the Court of Appeals called “an enormous 
judgment for the Plaintiffs”—a $1.48 billion verdict that measured the 
inflation in the price that the plaintiffs had to pay for their shares.199 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 415–16. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 417 n.4. 
 197. Id. at 416. 
 198. Id. at 41718. 
 199. Id. at 412, 431 n.14. 
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That amount increased to $2.46 billion when prejudgment interest was 
added.200 
As the Appellate Court also noted, that judgment was “apparently 
one of the largest to date.”201 The jury also apportioned those damages 
among the three defendants—55% to the company and the remaining 
45% among the three individuals (20% to Aldinger, 15% to 
Schoenholz, and 10% to Gilmer).202 
G.  Post-Trial and Phase Two 
Despite the Plaintiffs’ significant victory at trial, the case was 
hardly over. Household made repeated statements that it expected to 
prevail either in post-trial motions or on appeal.203 The company’s 
parent, HSBC, did the same.204 Several months after trial, therefore, 
the Defendants filed a sixty page motion for judgment as a matter of 
law and alternatively a 116 page motion for a new trial.205 
There they made twelve separate arguments including that the 
plaintiffs had failed to prove loss causation and materiality.206 They 
also disputed the plaintiffs’ claims about predatory lending, asserted 
that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent, and claimed the Court’s 
evidentiary rulings were unfair.207 Plaintiffs of course vigorously 
contested all of those points and prevailed when the trial judge denied 
them as moot and premature.208 
The Court then embarked on what it called Phase II of the trial to 
fix damages for each class member who had purchased their shares 
between March 23, 2001 and the date the damage period ended on 
October 11, 2002 or who had owned some stock before then and sold 
it during the damage period.209 To establish them, the Court set up a 
three-fold approach. 
(1) If the stockholders bought their shares when the Company was 
making false statements and did not sell, their damages would be the 
 
 200. Id. at 431 n.14. 
 201. Id. at 412. 
 202. Id. at 428. The jury found that Aldinger and Schoenholz were also liable as controlling 
persons of each other, Household, and Gilmer under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 
 203. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 94. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 93. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 9394. 
 209. Id. at 92, 95. 
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amount of artificial inflation at the time of their purchase.210 (2) If they 
purchased their stock before the class period and sold during the 
damage period at a gain or loss, their damages would be their out-of-
pocket losses less any gain they obtained or loss they avoided because 
of the artificial inflation at the time of sale.211 (3) For shares bought 
during the damage period, their damages would be the stock’s 
artificial inflation at the time of purchase less the artificial inflation at 
the time of sale.212 
The Court also set out a protocol for Phase II. It gave the 
defendants the ability to rebut the Basic presumption that their 
falsehoods had created a “fraud on the market” thus causing the 
plaintiffs to purchase their shares at an inflated price.213 The first two 
ways that the defendants could do that under Basic were by showing 
that the market knew the truth all along or that news of the fraud had 
entered the market and dissipated the impact of the falsehoods.214 The 
Court ruled, however, that the jury’s findings had precluded them.215 
The defendants therefore could now only rebut the “fraud-on-the-
market” presumption if they could “show that individual plaintiffs 
bought or sold Household stock without relying on the integrity of the 
market.”216 
To determine that, the Court approved a “Notice and Claim 
Questionnaire” to be sent to the class members.217 It asked them if they 
would have bought Household’s stock even if they had known its price 
was falsely inflated.218 If they answered “no,” they would be entitled 
to recovery.219 If they answered “yes,” their recovery would be subject 
to further proceedings.220 
The Court allowed the defendants to take additional discovery 
from some plaintiffs along those lines to see if they had not relied on 
Household’s stock price to purchase their shares.221 Following up on 
 
 210. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 95. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 430 (7th Cir. 2015); Basic, Inc. 
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988). 
 214. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 429. 
 215. Id. at 430. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 95. 
 218. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 430. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 431. 
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that, the defendants then served ninety-eight class members with 
interrogatories, requests for documents, and notices for depositions.222 
When plaintiffs’ attorneys objected to such broad demands, the court 
limited the number of depositions to just fifteen of the large 
institutional investors.223 It did however permit as much written 
discovery from class members as the defendants wanted to do.224 
After extensive arguments on how to deal with information 
garnered from that process, the Court ruled that it would award 
damages to all class members if they satisfied two factors indicating 
that they relied on the integrity of Household’s market price in 
purchasing their shares.225 Those were: (1) they stated on the 
questionnaire that they would not have bought the stock if they had 
known its price was falsely inflated and (2) no information turned up 
in discovery to contest that.226 
“When the time for answering the court’s preliminary questions 
had expired, a large number of the class members still had not 
responded.”227 The Court then divided that group into two classes 
depending on whether their claims were more or less than $250,000.228 
Class members above that amount would be required to answer the 
questionnaire.229 
If those class members answered “no” they would be entitled to 
recovery, assuming there were no other objections to their claims.230 
But if they indicated they might have bought Household’s stock 
anyway even if they had known of the company’s misrepresentations, 
the extent of their reliance on the integrity of the market price would 
have to be resolved in a Phase II trial.231 For those class members who 
failed to answer the questionnaire, the defendants would be entitled to 
judgment on their claims.232 
The Court also selected a Special Master to determine whether 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 96–97. 
 225. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 431; Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 99–100. 
 226. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 431. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. Ultimately, the trial court required all class members, regardless of their claim amount, 
to answer the questionnaire. Order at 1, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 
No. 02-C-5893 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2012). 
 230. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 100. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
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the claims of particular class members were valid or would have to be 
tried under the criteria the Court had established for awards.233 To 
accomplish that, elaborate processes were set up to communicate with 
class members and financial intermediaries who held their shares.234 
All that took thousands of hours.235 
 At the end of the second response period, 10,902 claimants 
answered “no” to the Court’s questions and they had no other 
ministerial objections to their claims outstanding.236 The Court 
therefore entered a partial judgment in their favor.237 With the addition 
of prejudgment interest, that amount totaled $2.46 billion.238 Other 
claimants had answered “yes” to the court’s questionnaire and still 
others had failed to answer it.239 At the time of the appeal, however, 
there were objections outstanding to over 20,000 other claims.240 Most 
of those belonged either to those who had failed to answer the 
questionnaire or whose claims were valued at less than $250,000.241 
H.  The Appeal 
The oral argument there was held on May 29, 2014 and featured 
two jurists whom presidential candidate Donald Trump had listed as 
potential Supreme Court nominees.242 One was Paul Clement, a 
former solicitor general of the United States under President George 
W. Bush who argued for the defendants,243 and the other was a judge 
with an equally illustrious conservative pedigree: Diane Sykes.244 The 
two other members of the panel were William Bauer, a Republican 
 
 233. Id. The defendants objected to the validity of approximately 30,000 claims; the Special 
Master was tasked with resolving those objections. Id. at 107. 
 234. Id. at 104. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 431 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 431–32. See also infra note 324 and accompanying text for a discussion of how those 
claims were ultimately involved in the settlement of the case. 
 242. Jeremy Diamond, Trump Unveils His Potential Supreme Court Nominees, CNN POLITICS, 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/05/18/politics/donald-trump-supreme-court-nominees/index.html (last 
updated May 18, 2016, 10:38 PM). 
 243. Professional Profile of Paul D. Clement – Partner, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, 
https://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&itemID=12018 (last visited Oct. 8, 
2018). 
 244. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 412; Diamond, supra note 242. 
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appointee and former prosecutor,245 then a senior judge in his late 80s, 
and Michael Kanne, another conservative,246 in his mid-70s. Michael 
Dowd, a name partner in the plaintiffs’ firm, argued for the 
shareholders.247 
The defendants sought to overturn the lower court’s verdict on 
three grounds. First, they challenged the Court’s instruction to the jury 
on what it means to “make” a false statement.248 Second, they claimed 
that the trial judge deprived them of a meaningful opportunity to rebut 
the presumption of reliance.249 And third, they argued that the 
plaintiffs had not proven that their damages were a result of the false 
statements attributed to the defendants.250 This last issue of loss 
causation proved most significant and ultimately led to a partial 
reversal.251 
The controlling precedent there, as has been stated, was the High 
Court’s decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals.252 It held that for a 
recovery under Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs must show not only that the 
falsehoods caused them to buy the stock at an inflated price 
(“transaction” or “but-for” causation) but also that they suffered 
financial damages because of their purchase (“loss causation”).253 
That meant that the shareholders had to demonstrate that the 
misrepresentations artificially increased the price of the stock they 
bought and then the revelation of those falsehoods made it drop. 
Judge Sykes, writing for the Household Court, gave a lucid 
description of how the plaintiffs could prove that. Because many 
factors can influence a stock’s movement, she said, it is hard to 
measure how much a particular misrepresentation or omission falsely 
increases its price.254 The better way to determine that is to see what 
happens to the stock’s worth when the truth comes out.255 As she 
 
 245. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 412; Profile of Bauer, William Joseph, FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/bauer-william-joseph (last visited Oct. , 2018). 
 246. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 412; Profile of Kanne, Michael Stephen, FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/kanne-michael-stephen (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
 247. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 412. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 429. 
 250. Id. at 412. 
 251. Id. 
 252. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 253. Id. at 345–46. 
 254. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 255. Id. 
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succinctly put it, “What goes up [falsely], must come down.”256 In 
other words, the decline in a share’s price, which follows the 
disclosure of falsehoods, is probably the best indicator of how much it 
was overvalued. 
The Court then acknowledged that the plaintiffs had engaged a 
renowned expert, Professor Daniel Fischel, to establish that.257 As has 
been discussed,258 he presented two different approaches to the jury—
the “specific disclosure” model and the “leakage” model. The latter 
theory, which the jury accepted and used as the basis for its verdict, 
was first articulated in a 1990 article.259 
There, two law and economic scholars asserted that specific 
relevant information about an event can underestimate the economic 
importance of it on the price of a firm’s stock.260 A better way to 
account fully for its impact on the share price would be to “extend the 
observation window surrounding the disclosure date.”261 That should, 
wrote the authors, begin when one can be “reasonably confident that 
no significant information leakage has occurred” and end when one 
“feels confident that most of the information is publicly available.”262 
Following Fischel’s use of that reasoning, Judge Sykes approved 
of how the jurors had applied it in the Household case.263 Fischel had 
presented them with the date of the California suit against the 
Company as the possible beginning of the leakage period so that they 
might reckon the drop in the stock’s price from that time.264 He told 
them they could then find that the disclosure period ended when 
Household settled the multi-state litigation.265 
Following that, the panel reasoned that the decline of $23.94 per 
share which the jury found using the leakage model was a good 
measure of how Household’s falsehoods affected the price of its 
stock.266 As has been described,267 that resulted in much larger 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 259. Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in 
Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 888 (1990). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 906. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 419 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 264. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 65. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 417. 
 267. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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damages than the specific disclosure model. That only included 
declines from dates on which Household’s stock price moved in a 
statistically significant manner different from the market generally and 
its industry peers.268 It therefore excluded price declines on other days 
when news regarding Household continued to leak into the market.269 
The Court then acknowledged there was little case law formally 
embracing the leakage model—most likely, as it said, “because these 
cases rarely make it to trial.”270 Yet Judge Sykes astutely found that 
the Supreme Court had implicitly accepted it in Dura Pharmaceuticals 
with its observation there that some shareholders may have no 
damages in fraud cases if they sell their shares before the truth about 
corporate falsehoods begins to “leak out.”271 
After thus whole-heartedly accepting the leakage model, the 
Court of Appeals then brushed off the defendants’ principal objection 
to it—“that it made no attempt to prove how Household’s stock price 
became inflated in the first instance.”272 The Court answered that by 
restating its basic insight on how shareholder-plaintiffs can prove loss 
causation.273 
They can do that, the Court repeated, by showing how the stock 
dropped as the truth gradually came out.274 Then in response to the 
defendants’ argument the panel stated, “How the stock became 
inflated in the first place is irrelevant because each subsequent false 
statement prevented the price from falling to its true value and 
therefore caused the price to remain elevated.”275 
More convincing to the court however were the defendants’ 
arguments that the leakage theory as presented to the jury did not 
account for “firm-specific, non-fraud factors that may have affected 
the decline in Household’s stock price.”276 Fischel’s models, said the 
Court, did control for “market and industry factors and general trends 
 
 268. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 415–16. 
 269. See id. at 416. 
 270. Id. (reporting that less than ½ of the 1% of securities class actions filed make it to trial); 
see also Mustokoff, supra note 33. 
 271. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 422 (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 
342 (2005)). 
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 273. Id. at 419. 
 274. Id. 
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misrepresentation skewed the price of the stock). 
 276. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 421. 
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in the economy” but not for other factors specific to Household.277 
 The Court noted that Fischel testified to those possibilities in a 
general sense and ruled them out.278 The panel also acknowledged that 
the defendants did not cross-examine Fischel on that opinion.279 In 
addition, the defendants did not themselves identify such information 
that might have affected Household’s stock.280 
Yet that was not enough, said the Court, to eliminate other firm 
specific, non-fraud related factors from being possible causes for the 
stock’s decline.281 To establish loss causation under the leakage model 
there had to be “non-conclusory” testimony to that effect.282 The Court 
therefore reversed and ordered a retrial on that matter.283 
Nevertheless, the Court’s general approval of the leakage method 
for proving damages gave the plaintiffs a major victory and it broke 
new ground to advance these actions, making them potentially more 
remunerative for shareholders victimized by fraud. Yet by demanding 
additional proof to rule out other factors that might have caused the 
stock’s drop, the panel stopped short of affirming the judgment of the 
district court and giving the plaintiffs an immediate win. 
Perhaps the Court just wanted the plaintiffs’ lawyers to work a 
little harder for their billion-dollar recovery! In any event, its 
requirement for more particularized proof that no firm-specific, non-
fraudulent information affected the decline in Household’s stock put a 
limit on the leakage model.284 
The other two issues that defendants raised on appeal proved 
much less consequential. Since the trial, the Supreme Court had 
decided the Janus case. As has been stated, it held that only those who 
have the ultimate authority for false statements can “make” them.285 
Therefore, the trial court’s pre-Janus instructions to the jury which 
made the defendants liable if they merely furnished language or 
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‘needed to eliminate any firm-specific, non-fraud related factors that might have contributed to the 
stock’s decline’”). 
 278. Glickenhaus & Co., 787 F.3d at 421. 
 279. Id. at 421–22. 
 280. Id. at 422. 
 281. Id. at 420. 
 282. Id. at 422. 
 283. Id. at 433. 
 284. Mustokoff, supra note 33, at 219. 
 285. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142, 144 (2011). 
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information that ended up being disseminated to the public were not 
enough to satisfy that standard. 
Certain of the individual defendants therefore could be entitled to 
a new trial on the issue of whether they had “made” certain false 
statements attributed to them. Before the re-trial, however, the parties 
ironed that issue out by agreeing which statements by the individual 
defendants made them potentially liable under the Janus test.286 
In addition, the Appellate Court dismissed the defendants’ 
arguments that it should invalidate Phase II of the trial because that 
process did not allow them to rebut Basic’s presumption about the 
plaintiffs’ reliance on Household’s market price.287 To the contrary, 
the panel found that the questionnaire sent to each shareholder 
plaintiff, with the availability of follow-up discovery, was an accurate 
and practical way to determine that.288 
The Court of Appeals instead faulted the defendants for merely 
lodging general objections to the pragmatic approach that the trial 
court had adopted to resolve that issue.289 It turned aside their protests 
with this terse comment, “[the defendants] don’t specify what the 
Court should have done differently.”290 
I.  Preparations for Retrial and Settlement 
 The unfortunate result for the plaintiffs from all this however was 
that they had to retry the case. Despite the panel’s acceptance of the 
leakage method and its approval of the claims process, the Court of 
Appeals did not affirm the judgement.291 Instead, it remanded the 
matter for a new trial, compelling the shareholders to litigate the 
damage issues again.292 This time their burden was greater. They 
would have to present more particularized evidence that the 
defendants’ falsehoods—not other firm specific, non-fraudulent 
factors—caused the decline in the value of their shares.293 
On remand, the case was re-assigned to another U.S. District 
Judge, Jorge Alonso, who had assumed his position just a year 
 
 286. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 125. 
 287. Id. at 94–95. 
 288. Id. at 95. 
 289. Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 432 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 433. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 415. 
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earlier.294 His previous legal career had principally entailed criminal 
work, first as a public defender and then as a state court trial judge.295 
Judge Alonso’s first rulings re-enforced the daunting task that the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers again faced. 
He held that plaintiffs would once more have to show that the 
defendants’ misstatements were “a substantial cause of the economic 
losses suffered by the Plaintiffs.”296 They would also have to reprove 
“the amount of per share damages, if any, to which plaintiffs were 
entitled.”297 The Court did however rule that the plaintiffs would not 
have to show the defendants’ statements were fraudulent or that they 
made them with scienter.298 The findings from the first trial that the 
defendants’ made those falsehoods knowingly or recklessly would 
stand.299 
Since the plaintiffs did not prevail on appeal, the defendants 
claimed they were entitled to the costs of that proceeding—most 
significantly, the $13,281,282.00 premium they had to expend for a 
bond guaranteeing payment of the judgment.300 Despite arguments 
made by the plaintiffs’ lawyers, which included that such a ruling 
would chill future class action suits, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to 
reimburse the defendants for the full amount, more than $13 
million.301 
An eight-figure payment like that would break the back of almost 
all other law firms who routinely take these cases on a contingent fee 
basis and agree to bear all their costs. Yet to show its full commitment 
to the case Robbins Geller immediately wired the full amount—more 
than $13 million—to the defendants.302 Because of the magnitude of 
 
 294. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 117; Profile of Alonso, Jorge Luis, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/alonso-jorge-luis (last visited Oct. 9, 2018). 
 295. Profile of Alonso, Jorge Luis, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/ 
alonso-jorge-luis (last visited Oct. 9, 2018). 
 296. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 117–18. 
 297. Id. at 118 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 118–19. 
 302. Plaintiffs’ Motion & Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for an Award of 
Attorneys’ Fees & Expenses & Reasonable Costs & Expenses for Lead Plaintiffs at 3, Lawrence 
E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 2016 WL 10571774 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2016) (No. 
02-C-5893) (“Demonstrating their resolve and commitment, Lead Counsel refused to fold and 
instead paid the $13.28 million out-of-pocket and prepared the case for a second trial.”). 
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that sum, the law firm’s swift response astounded Judge Alonso.303 
The parties again began making extensive preparations for trial, 
which the Court set to begin within a year on June 6, 2016.304 Professor 
Fischel then started to refashion his opinion to meet the concerns of 
the appellate court. That entailed reviewing his original findings to see 
if there were any changes in Household’s stock during the relevant 
period that might be due to firm-specific, non-fraudulent 
information.305 
At trial, Fischel had testified that he assumed that any changes in 
Household’s stock price, other than those explained by market and 
industry trends, were caused by fraud-related disclosures.306 His 
revised report however was more specific. Now reviewing 
information in the market during the twenty-seven disclosure dates he 
had previously identified, he concluded that as to all but one there was 
no cause for the stock’s decline other than leakage of the fraud.307 
The defendants in turn retained three experts to dispute Fischel’s 
new opinion.308 One was the self-same Bradford Cornell, the lead 
author of the article that had first advanced the leakage method.309 The 
defendants’ experts roundly criticized Fischel, arguing that numerous 
other items of information could have produced the decline in 
Household’s shares.310 Professor Cornell also asserted that Fischel 
misapplied his methodology.311 
The defendants then moved to exclude Fischel’s opinion.312 Judge 
Alonso however ruled that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient proof 
to meet the appellate court’s requirements about the absence of firm-
specific, non-fraudulent factors that could have contributed to the 
decline in the price of Household’s shares.313 The defendants would 
then have to refute that at the new trial.314 
In May 2016 then, a team of fourteen Robbins Geller attorneys, 
 
 303. Judge Alonso shared that impression with the author of this Article. 
 304. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 118. 
 305. Id. at 119. 
 306. Mustokoff, supra note 33, at 215. 
 307. Id. at 217. 
 308. Burkholz Report, supra note 36, at 119. 
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other professionals, and support staff returned to Chicago and began 
engaging in lengthy preparations for the retrial.315 In anticipation of 
that, the parties made a number of motions in limine.316 Some of them 
involved questions about whether certain findings from the first trial 
could be considered proven or would have to be retried.317 Others 
concerned evidentiary issues.318  
Importantly, for the Lead Plaintiff to give the new jury a flavor of 
Household’s fraud, the Court ruled that it would again allow the 
introduction of certain material that showed Household’s predatory 
lending practices.319 That included the training video used by the 
Company for its new employees that promoted such unscrupulous 
conduct.320 
In the midst of all this pretrial sparring mediated settlement 
negotiations continued.321 Even though the plaintiffs had prevailed at 
the original trial on the issue of loss causation, they faced substantial 
risks that the new jury would not again find for them on that crucial 
element.322 Yet even if it did, the second jury might not fix damages 
by using the leakage model, as had the first jury, but instead might use 
the specific-disclosure method that would result in a much smaller 
verdict.323 
In addition, even if plaintiffs were successful in achieving a 
substantial win as they did in the original trial, they would still be 
facing another appeal that would certainly delay the ultimate outcome 
of the case. Worse, a new appellate decision might even undo the 
plaintiffs’ success as had happened in the first round of the litigation. 
The plaintiffs however were not without some leverage of their 
own in the settlement talks. As the Appellate Court noted, thousands 
of claims remained unresolved—most involving situations where 
class members had failed to answer the Court’s questions or where 
claims were valued at less than $250,000.324 A finding that those were 
meritorious and entitled to pre-judgment interest could increase the 
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plaintiffs’ recovery well beyond the $2.46 billion judgment that 
resulted from the first round of litigation. 
With all that at stake, Judge Alonso was happy when he came into 
his chambers the morning of trial and saw a sticky-note on his chair 
telling him the case had been resolved.325 It had settled at four that 
morning for $1.575 billion—the largest securities fraud class action 
recovery ever following a trial.326 Depending on the model used, the 
class members would recover an astonishing amount—between 75% 
of their damages (if the jury adopted the Specific Disclosure Model) 
and 252% (if the jury used the Leakage Model).327  
J.  Reflections 
 The result of this litigation was thus a grand success for the class 
members, thanks to the skill and persistence of their lead counsel, the 
Robbins Geller law firm. Yet because of procedural challenges by an 
army of lawyers for the defendants and the exercise of their appellate 
rights, it took the defrauded shareholders fourteen years from the 
commencement of their suit to achieve this outcome. If there is truth 
in the maxim “justice delayed is justice denied,” this case may be a 
prime example of that unfairness! 
Put simply, if we accept the jury’s finding that the defendants 
cheated 30,000 of their shareholders by rigging Household’s financial 
statements and causing them to pay more for their shares than they 
should have, why couldn’t our legal system have provided those 
stockholders a speedier remedy? For sure, the wheels of justice grind 
slowly, but fourteen years? 
To that end, the remarks by a renowned jurist, Judge Richard 
Posner now retired from the federal appellate bench are instructive. 
He would greatly pare down the rules of civil procedure and require 
that legal briefs be shorter, without exaggeration or emphasis on minor 
points.328 Along those lines, he has stated that he decides cases in this 
manner: “The way I approach a case is by asking myself, ‘What would 
be a common sense result, forgetting about the law? You have a 
problem: What’s the best solution based on basic moral values, 
 
 325. From a conversation between Judge Alonso and the author. 
 326. Reply Memo, supra note 45, at 1. 
 327. Id. at 4. 
 328. Cooper, supra note 11. 
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economic insights, whatever makes sense.”329  
Much of the unwarranted delay in this case came from the 
extensive motions to dismiss made and briefed exhaustively by the 
defendants. Of course, those charged with wrongdoing should have 
the opportunity to test the legal sufficiency of the accusations against 
them and the legal rules governing securities litigation are certainly 
complex. Yet how much of the argumentation in a case like this 
legitimately serves that purpose? Often it is just a way for well-funded 
defendants (and their lawyers who are paid handsome hourly sums) to 
grind down plaintiffs or deter them all together from bringing these 
suits. 
In addition, the discovery in this case went on for years. That 
process should also be streamlined.330 Once again, however, such 
reforms must recognize that plaintiffs have a legitimate need to dig out 
significant facts relating to their cases. For instance, it was important 
for the shareholders here to compel disclosure of training videos 
instructing Household’s salesforce to engage in predatory lending 
practices.331 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Household case demonstrates that it is possible for defrauded 
shareholders to gain ample redress for their losses even when 
defendants with great resources vigorously resist claims against them. 
Plaudits go to the Robbins Geller law firm for achieving this notable 
victory for their clients and affirming that the law can produce such a 
satisfying result even when opposed by well-funded and well-advised 
wrongdoers. 
We hear a lot about how class action suits serve only to enrich 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, while providing very little for the claimants 
themselves. The good and relentless work of the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
 
 329. Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEM OF JURISPRUDENCE 466 (1990) (Posner 
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here shows just how wrong those assertions can be. Yet their 
significant success took fourteen years and a herculean legal effort to 
accomplish. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that the goal 
of our legal system is “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”332 If we are truly 
committed to that ideal, our legal system must find ways to achieve 
swifter justice for defrauded shareholders. 
 
 332. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
